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The existence and ownership of the "goodwill" of professional
partnerships' is one of the most muddled subjects in partnership law.
Courts employ different definitions of goodwill and reach disparate
results. Most importantly, they have held that professional partner-
ships have little goodwill available for distribution to withdrawing
partners or deceased partners' estates,2 but substantial goodwill for
purposes of distributions to spouses in marital dissolutions.3
This Article concludes that the accounting concept of goodwill does
not help identify the rights of withdrawing partners or partners'
spouses in professional partnerships. The central problem is the diffi-
culty of separating what is owned by such firms from the human capi-
tal owned by the partners individually. The accounting concept leads
to a blind alley in terms of valuation and does not make sense of the
case law.
The Article substitutes for the accounting approach a theoretical
analysis of the partners' rights that views the rights of withdrawing
partners in terms of optimal default compensation rules. It leads to
the conclusion that withdrawing partners should not have a default
property right in expected cash flows of the firm analogous to what
has been characterized as "goodwill." On the other hand, broader
rights of partners' divorced spouses may be justified by considerations
applicable specifically to the divorce setting.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes and explains the
conventional accounting concept of goodwill. It shows that this con-
cept contributes little to a determination of rights in professional part-
nerships because partnership goodwill is impossible to value in this
context. Moreover, Part II shows how both the partner withdrawal
and divorce cases have departed significantly and in different ways
from the conventional meaning of goodwill. The remainder of the Ar-
ticle applies economic analysis to issues regarding the goodwill of pro-
fessional partnerships. Part III analyzes the property rights of
withdrawing partners, while Part IV articulates the different consid-
erations that apply to the rights of partners' spouses in marital
dissolutions.
1. This term is used here to refer to partnerships whose cash flows are produced
primarily by the human capital of their members, as distinguished from financial
capital such as inventory, real estate and manufacturing facilities. Thus, the term
includes not only medical, law, architecture and accounting firms, but any per-
sonal-service-oriented business.
2. See infra note 45-46.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 58-74.
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I. DEFINITION AND VALUATION OF GOODWILL
This Part describes the conventional meaning of goodwill as ap-
plied to professional partnerships. Section A states and analyzes the
accepted definition of goodwill, while section B examines the appro-
priate way to value the goodwill of professional partnerships.
A. The Definition of Goodwill
This section states the conventional accounting meaning of good-
will, articulates the economic basis of this definition, and introduces
the important subject of how and why legal meanings may differ from
accounting conventions.
1. Accounting Definition in General
Accountants define goodwill as "excess" value that cannot be at-
tributed to specific tangible and intangible assets.4 This value can be
determined by assigning values to specific assets and subtracting these
from the actual value of the firm, perhaps based on capitalizing the
firm's earnings.5 Largely because of its highly subjective nature, good-
will is not accounted for on a company's balance sheet unless the com-
pany has established its value by purchasing it.6
The accounting definition is stated largely in terms of valuation.7
The economic reasoning underlying the accounting valuation is that
goodwill represents the extra value or "synergy" arising from joint use
of assets in a firm.8 It includes, for example, economies of scale result-
ing from combining plant capacity, efficient organization of productive
assets, and the reduction in contracting costs from owning important
assets rather than contracting for their use.9 Perhaps most impor-
4. See Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, 241; DISCUSSION MEMORANDUM ON ACCOUNT-
ING FOR BUSINESS COMBINATIONS AND PURCHASED INTANGIBLES 47-51 (Fin. Ac-
counting Standards Bd. 1976); S. DAVIDSON & R. WEIL, HANDBOOK OF MODERN
ACCOUNTING 21-27 (2d ed. 1977); T. FIFUS, H. KRu'KE & P. FOSTER, ACCOUNTING
FOR BUSINEss LAwYERS: T ACHING MATERIALS 262-65 (3d ed. 1984); 1 L. SEIDLER
& D. CARMICHAEL, ACCOUNTANT'S HANDBOOK § 23, at 5 (6th ed. 1981); R. KAY &
G. SEARFOSS, HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING 23-28 (1988).
5. Capitalized earnings valuation is discussed in subsection I.B.2.
6. See S. DAVIDSON & R. WEIL, supra note 4, at 21-15; R. KAY & G. SEARFOSS, supra
note 4, at 23-33; 1 L. SEMLER & D. CARMICHAEL, supra note 4, § 23, at 33. How-
ever, goodwill is only part of the difference between the firm's balance sheet net
worth and its market value. Another unrecorded element of market value is the
difference between the depreciated historical cost and current value of recorded
assets. See T. FIFLIS, H. KRiPKE & P. FOSTER, supra note 4, at 634-73.
7. See Parkman, The Treatment of Professional Goodwill in Divorce Proceedings, 18
FAM. L.Q. 213, 213 (1984).
8. This is closely related to the "team production" concept of the firm. See infra
text accompanying notes 78-79.
9. For example, a firm can cut costs by purchasing an important source of supply
and thereby eliminating the possibility that a separate owner will attempt to ex-
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tantly in professional firms, goodwill arises from the application of
management and monitoring to other inputs such as employees and
equipment.
Goodwill should be distinguished from the category of "intangi-
ble," or non-physical, assets. Goodwill can inhere in even the most
"tangible" asset to the extent that the asset has extra value in conjunc-
tion with other assets. For example, the firm may derive value from
skillfully using its equipment or exploiting its location. Moreover,
even to the extent that goodwill can be considered intangible or non-
physical, it is only a subcategory of intangible assets. Some intangibles
such as patents have value even apart from their use in conjunction
with other assets. Accordingly, such intangibles are not properly char-
acterized as goodwill in themselves, although they may have extra
synergy value that is includable in the general goodwill of the firm.
By contrast, a firm's trade name is largely "goodwill" because it is
identified with the firm's general reputation, which in turn results
from, among other things, the extra value produced by the assets in
place.O
2. "Firm" vs. "Personal" Goodwill
In valuing professional partnerships it is important to separate
goodwill that is property of the firm (referred to here as "firm good-
will") from the reputations of partners and other partnership employ-
ees that are not partnership property ("personal goodwill"). Cash
flows produced by a firm are almost always associated to some extent
with the people who provide managerial, monitoring and other skills,
or whose reputations may attract customers. The compensation these
people receive for their efforts is their own property, or "personal
ploit its advantage by raising the price. See Klein, Crawford & Alchian, Vertical
Integration, Appropriable Rents and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L.
& ECON. 297 (1978).
10. Thus, one or more partners may be precluded from using a partnership's trade
name in order to avoid deceiving the public, which relies on the reputation of the
firm as a whole that is signalled by the trade name. See Messer v. The Fadettes,
168 Mass. 140, 46 N.E. 407 (1897); Bailey v. Betti, 241 N.Y. 22, 148 N.E. 776 (1925);
Bailey v. Betti, 126 Misc. 45,212 N.Y.S. 455 (1925); Siddall v. Keating, 8 A.D.2d 44,
185 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1959), aff'd, 7 N.Y.2d 846, 196 N.Y.S.2d 896, 164 N.E.2d 860
(1959); Blakely v. Sousa, 197 Pa. 305, 47 A. 286 (1900); MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-11 (1983)[hereinafter MODEL CODE]; MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 7.5 (1989)[hereinafter MODEL RULES]; 2 A.
BROMBERG & L. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG & RIBSTEUI ON PARTNERSHP § 7.12(a), at
7:110 (1988)[hereinafter BROMBERG & RasTN]. Even when the partners do
have the right to use the partnership's name, they may have to account to their
co-partners for profits derived from this use of the firm's reputation. See Richter
v. Richter, 202 Ga. 554, 43 S.E.2d 635 (1947); Estate of Spingarn, 5 Misc. 2d 36, 159
N.Y.S.2d 532 (1956); 2 BROMBERG & RnSTEN, supra, § 7.12(b)(1), at 7:111.
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goodwill." Any residual attributed to these efforts but not paid as
compensation is part of the equity holders' interests.
Even partnerships that rely on the partners' skills or reputations
rather than financial capital potentially have firm goodwill. First, the
compensation of partners and other employees is based to some extent
on the market for their services. Partners' human capital may be
firm-specific in the sense that it has greater value to their current firm
than to other firms."l If so, the partner may not be able to bargain for
compensation equalling the full value of her services to the firm.'2
Second, the partners' value to the firm may be inseparable from
value added by combining the partners' services with other human
and financial resources. For example, partners and other employees
may work harder or more efficiently because of monitoring by part-
ners.' 3 In other words, there is a synergy between monitoring and the
partners' personal goodwill. Because the two cannot be separated pre-
cisely, the partners' residual claim may include earnings attributable
partly to personal skills or reputations of other partners.
The distinction between personal and firm goodwill thus turns on
partners' compensation for services, which determines the extent of
the partners' residual claims. It does not turn, as some commentators
believe,14 on whether a firm's value is attributed to particular part-
ners' reputations, or on whether those partners can withdraw and
take their reputations with them. As long as the partners are associ-
ated with the firm some of the earnings attributed to them may be
part of the other partners' ownership interests.'5
11. See infra text accompanying notes 95-96 (discussing firm-specific human capital
and its role in determining partner compensation).
12. This does not mean, however, that the partner's compensation necessarily is lim-
ited to the value of the services to other firms. The partner may have negotiating
leverage because her services are uniquely valuable to the other partners. More-
over, the other partners may agree ex ante to compensate for the full value of
firm-specific skills in order to encourage the partner to develop such skills. See
infra text accompanying notes 95-96.
13. See 2 VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY § 25.05[1], at 23-65
(1988)(goodwill may include efficient exploitation of salaried workers). In large
law practices, goodwill may be attributable to partners' profits from associates'
efforts. See Friedman, Professional Practice Goodwil. An Abused Value Con-
cept, 2 J. AcAD. MATRimON AL LAw. 23, 30 (1986). These profits may be at least
partly explained by the synergy of partners' monitoring and training and the as-
sociates' human capital.
14. See, eg., Parkman, supra note 7, at 214-15:
To the extent that a business is more profitable than its competitors be-
cause of the superior abilities or business connections of an individual,
the profits are attributable to the individual, not the business. The indi-
vidual should be able to capture the higher profits in higher wages or
will move to a competitor.
15. The dependence of partnership earnings on particular partners' reputations is,
however, relevant to the distinction between firm and personal goodwill. The
more earnings can be identified to particular partners, the more likely it is that
[Vol. 70:38
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3. Legal vs. Accounting Definitions
The legal definition of goodwill may differ from both the account-
ing and economic meanings. To some extent this seems attributable
simply to the economic ignorance of courts and legal commentators.
For example, a venerable and often-quoted definition of goodwill is
"nothing more than the probability that the old customers will resort
to the old place."16 This differs from the accounting definition of
goodwill in at least two respects. First, it refers only to the particular
aspect of goodwill comprised of favorable relationships with custom-
ers. In other words, it focuses solely on revenue, and excludes consid-
eration of the firm's extra profitability on the cost side arising from,
for example, favorable relationships with suppliers and creditors,17 or
from any joint use of assets that produces cost-savings irrespective of
the firm's reputation. Second, this definition includes non-goodwill el-
ements of value associated with particular assets such as location
rather than synergistic use of assets.
The legal definition of goodwill may differ from accounting and
economic meanings not only by indirection, but also because the con-
text of the legal determination matters. For example, one court char-
acterized a patent as "goodwill" in order to penalize a wrongfully
withdrawing partner.S Another court, in order to effectuate the
parties' intent in a close corporation buy-sell agreement, held that
"book value" included goodwill despite contrary expert accounting
testimony.19
As discussed below, 20 the legal context is clearly important in con-
nection with determining professional partnership goodwill in divorce
cases. The importance of context indicates that factors other than the
accounting definition, perhaps including those discussed below in
Parts III and IV, have a role in shaping the case law.
4. Summary
From an accounting standpoint, partnership assets can be sepa-
those partners will be in a position to negotiate to be paid for their full contribu-
tions to the firm. Furthermore, the expected value of cash flows linked to partic-
ular partners turns on the likelihood those partners will remain with the firm.
This can depend on such things as the existence of restrictive non-competition
agreements that bind the partners to the firm.
16. Cruttwell v. Lye, 17 Ves. 335, 346, 34 Eng. Rep 129, 134 (Ch. 1810).
17. See 2 BROMBERG & RBSrrnN, supra note 10, § 7.13(c), at 7:124-7:125.
18. See Pay-Saver Corp. v. Vasso Corp., 143 IlM. App. 3d 1013, 493 N.E.2d 423 (1986).
As goodwill, the value of the patent would not be distributable to the wrongful
partner under the UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 38(2), 6 U.L.A. 1, 456-57 (1969)[here-
inafter U.P.A.].
19. See Piedmont Publishing Co. v. Rogers, 193 Cal. A0p. 2d 171, 14 Cal. Rptr. 133
(1961).
20. See infra Part IV.
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rated into the following categories: (1) tangible or physical assets,
such as furniture, books and machines; (2) intangible assets such as
patents and copyrights that can be valued discretely; and (3) "good-
will" that arises from the particular firm's synergistic combination of
tangible and intangible assets. In a professional firm, it is necessary to
distinguish both specific firm assets and firm goodwill from human
capital owned by the individual partners. As discussed in section B,
this distinction presents formidable valuation problems.
B. Valuation of Goodwill
This section will discuss methods of valuing partnership goodwill
in the light of the analysis in section A.
1. Market Value
One way to value partnership goodwill is to examine amounts actu-
ally paid on account of goodwill (1) by purchasers of the firm; (2) by
purchasers of comparable firms; or (3) to individual, withdrawing
partners in the same or comparable firms.21
There are several potential problems with applying this approach
to professional firms. First, in light of the personal nature of profes-
sional firms, it may be difficult to determine whether firms being used
for valuation are comparable to the firm being valued.
A second problem with market valuation is that it may be difficult
to determine the extent to which the price represented payment for
partnership goodwill. If the seller has agreed to recommend or to re-
frain from competing with the buyer, payment to the seller represents
at least partly payment for the partner's post-withdrawal cooperation
rather than on account of the partner's ownership interest in the
firm.22
2. The Capitalized Earnings Approach
If there is no basis for a market valuation, the parties or court may
use the conventional "capitalized earnings" approach. This method
produces a substitute market price by considering how hypothetical
buyers and sellers might determine the firm's investment value.
The capitalized earnings approach determines the firm's expected
future returns and fixes an asset value by applying a "capitalizer" to
those expected returns. The value of expected future returns is com-
monly determined by averaging earnings over the five or so most re-
cent years. The "capitalizer" is the product of the formula V = c x e,
21. See Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, 242.
22. Cf. In re Estate of McCubbin, 125 Ill. App. 3d 74, 465 N.E.2d 672 (1984)(estate of
deceased physician did not include value of sole practice; the court distinguished
cases involving covenants not to compete as not involving firm goodwill).
[Vol. 70:38
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where V is the value of the investment, e is the expected earnings and
c is the capitalizer. The capitalizer reflects both the risk associated
with the investment and expected growth. Thus, a high capitalizer
means that the investment is relatively low risk or has a high expected
rate of growth, or some combination of the two.23
The capitalizer conventionally is derived from the stock price of
similar publicly traded firms. Since law, accounting or other profes-
sional firms do not have publicly traded analogues, the courts must
substitute some guesswork. For example, in Dugan v. Dugan,24 the
court, in valuing a sole law practice in a divorce case, said that it was
important to consider the likelihood of repeat patronage and the hus-
band's immunity from competition in comparison with other lawyers.
The court said the evidence did not support the expert's use of a
capitalizer of five.
Applying the capitalized earnings approach produces a going con-
cern value for professional firms that includes what is commonly char-
acterized as goodwill. Each partner would be entitled to share in this
value on dissolution of the firm in accordance with the Uniform Part-
nership Act (U.P.A.) or the parties' agreement.25 If the partnership
business continued after partner dissociation, the leaving partner
would, in effect, sell her interest in the goodwill to the other partners.
Use of the capitalized earnings approach theoretically is not pre-
cluded in professional firms by the fact that the firm's expected earn-
ings are substantially attributable to the partners' skills and
reputations. Consistent with the conventional meaning of goodwill,
this expectation is a component of the partnership's assets to the ex-
tent that there is a residual remaining after the partners are compen-
sated for their services.26
Nor is the capitalized earnings method necessarily inapplicable be-
cause the firm's continuity is constantly threatened by potential part-
ner withdrawal. If the partnership is being valued in connection with
a partner's withdrawal, expected earnings must be determined with-
out the component of those earnings attributed to the withdrawing
partner. While the remaining partners technically have the power
and right to withdraw and to take business with them,27 they may be
bound to the firm by non-competition agreements28 or because of the
structure of withdrawal compensation.29 Moreover, the risk of key
23. See I. BREALEY & S. MYESa, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANcE 56-61 (3d ed.
1988).
24. 92 N.J. 423, 457 A.2d 1 (1983).
25. See infra text accompanying notes 39-43.
26. See supra subsection IA.2.
27. See Fraser v. Bogucki, 203 Cal. App. 3d 604, 250 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1988)(denying law
partner's claim against former partners for appropriation of client relationships).
28. See 2 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 10, § 7.12(b)(2).
29. See infmr text accompanying notes 118-120 (amount of withdrawal compensation
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partners' withdrawal can be taken into account in selecting the
capitalizer.
This is no different from market valuation of publicly traded non-
professional firms. The market value of many conventional non-pro-
fessional corporations is significantly determined by the talents of
their personnel, including dynamic chief executives, innovative re-
searchers and the like, who are not irrevocably bound to the firm.3 0
That is why market price may rise or fall in the event of personnel
changes. 3 '
3. Problems With Applying Capitalized Earnings Valuation to
Professional Firms
Although capitalized earnings valuation is theoretically appropri-
ate for professional firms, its application should be qualified in the lat-
ter context because of an important difference between professional
partnerships and non-professional firms. The earnings used to calcu-
late the non-professional firm's investment value are computed after
deducting all expenses, including executive compensation. However,
in professional partnerships, the partners receive profit shares that re-
flect compensation for both their human capital and financial contri-
butions. In order to determine a value for a professional partnership
that is equivalent to that of a comparable non-professional firm, it is
necessary to subtract from total partnership cash flows the capitalized
value of compensation for the partners' human capital contributions.3 2
It follows that applying the capitalized earnings approach to pro-
may be set to deter opportunistic withdrawal); Antolik v. Harvey, 761 P.2d 305
(Haw. App. 1988)(questioning refusal to apply capitalized earnings approach to
valuation of goodwill where the firm has the legal right to partners' continued
services or non-competition).
30. It is true that chief executive officers often can negotiate for compensation that
equals or exceeds their contributions to the firm's value. That is because they
bargain with friendly boards of directors, and because the shareholders' costs of
disciplining overcompensation through such devices as proxy contests or tender
offers often exceeds the amount of the overcompensation. This observation is
supported by evidence that the death of chief executives can increase the firm's
market value. See Johnson, Magee, Nagarajian & Newman, An Analysis of the
Stock Price Reaction to Sudden Executive Deaths, 7 J. ACCT. & ECON. 151 (1985).
There is also evidence that top executive compensation is affected only slightly by
firm performance. See Jensen & Murphy, Performance Pay and Top Manage-
ment Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225 (1990). However, these considerations may
not apply to lower-level executives who have less leverage in negotiating their
compensation, and whose separate personal contributions are more difficult to
identify. See Coffee, The Uncertain Case for Takeover Refor=n. An Essay on
Stockholders, Stakeholders and Bust-Ups, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 435.
31. For evidence that death of chief executives can positively or negatively influence
firm value, see Johnson, Magee, Nagarajian & Newman, supra note 30.
32. See supra subsection IA.2 ("firm goodwill" is amount remaining after subtracting
partner compensation representing "personal goodwill").
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fessional firms may overvalue goodwill. Indeed, in small law or medi-
cal practices, there may be little that can be characterized as an
ownership interest because the partners probably will be paid virtu-
ally all of the net revenues as compensation for their human capital
contributions.33 Thus, at least most of a partner's compensation is at-
tributable to "personal goodwill." To put this another way, a non-
partner or inactive partner would receive very little on account of an
ownership interest in a small professional firm.34
The problem, therefore, in using the capitalized earnings approach
in the professional firm context is that it may be impossible to sepa-
rate a professional partner's ownership interest in the firm from the
partner's income as an employee. Theoretically, this could be done by
determining the partners' comparable compensation outside the
firm.3 5 However, for several reasons this is impractical. First, it is
prohibitively difficult to establish comparability among professionals
because their talents and specialties are so varied.
Second, even a comparable professional's salary cannot be used as a
standard because the salary is a function of circumstances different
form those that apply in the partnership. In particular, the profes-
sional may accept a lower salary in a corporation in exchange for bear-
ing less risk in terms of job insecurity and income variability,36 or in
exchange for a higher level of shirking.37
Third, even if the partner's pay opportunity outside the firm is
known, this does not necessarily limit the partner's compensation in
the firm because the partner's services may be more valuable in the
firm, and the partner may be able to negotiate to be paid this extra
value.38
In short, the accounting concept of professional partnership good-
will presents serious valuation problems. Comparable market values
are often unavailable, and attempting to substitute capitalized earn-
ings valuation presents insuperable problems. For this reason alone,
some alternative method must be found for determining partners'
33. Id.
34. By contrast, in a larger practice there may be substantial earnings from relatively
anonymous employees, technical equipment, monitoring and organization that is
not distributed as compensation to particular employees. Thus, advertising agen-
cies and brokerage firms have publicly traded stock despite their professional na-
ture. Even an accounting firm reportedly has arranged to go public. See Cowan,
C.P.A. 's to Sell Stock in Practice, N.Y. Times, June 14, 1990, at D7, col. 4.
35. See Gilson & Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An Economic
Inquiry into the Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REv. 313,
354 (1985).
36. See Friedman, supra note 13, at 27; Parkman, supra note 7, at 221.
37. See Dugan v. Dugan, 92 N.J. 423, 457 A.2d 1 (1983)(excluding from goodwill any
extra compensation to a professional partner attributable to expending greater
effort).
38. See supra note 12.
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rights. As discussed in the following three sections, the confusion in
the case law and the policies regarding partner compensation and the
rights of partners' spouses provide additional reasons.
II. THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP GOODWILL
This Part discusses how the courts have approached professional
partnership "goodwill" in determining the rights of partners on with-
drawal from the firm, and of partners' spouses in marital dissolutions.
It shows that these cases differ both from each other and from the
conventional accounting concept of goodwill discussed in Part II.
A. Denial of Right to Share in Goodwill on Dissolution
The U.P.A. defines the parties' rights on dissolution of a partner-
ship in the absence of contrary agreement. The partnership dissolves
on any dissociation of a partner from the partnership,3 9 including
death, expression of will to dissolve the relationship, and with-
drawal.4 0 If the dissolution is not in contravention or otherwise
wrongful, as where there is an unexpired term or uncompleted under-
taking, the partnership assets must be sold and debts paid unless all of
the partners, including the withdrawing partner, agree to continuation
of the partnership and a payoff of the withdrawing partner.4 ' In the
event of a continuation, the dissociating partner is paid the value of
her interest.42 If the dissolution was wrongful, the non-wrongful part-
ners may agree to continue the firm and pay the wrongful partner the
value of her interest less damages and excluding goodwill.43
Under these provisions, the issue of goodwill may arise whenever
the partnership is continued after withdrawal of a non-wrongfully dis-
solving partner,44 when it is necessary under the U.P.A. to determine
the "value" of the dissociating partner's interest in the partnership.
The cases hold that a withdrawing partner is entitled only to ele-
ments of value related to such things as location or organization, and
39. See U.P.A. § 31, 6 U.L.A. 1, 376-77 (1969).
40. Partner withdrawal is part of the definition of partnership under section 29 of
U.P.A., although it is not listed among the dissolution causes in section 31. For
cases holding that partner withdrawal causes dissolution, see, e.g., Great Hawai-
ian Fin. Corp. v. Aiu, 863 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1988)(applying Hawaiian law); Ram-
seyer v. Ramseyer, 98 Idaho 47, 558 P.2d 76 (1976); Schoeller v. Schoeller, 465
S.W.2d 648 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971).
41. See U.P.A. § 38, 6 U.L.A. 1, 456-57 (1969).
42. Id. § 42, 6 U.L.A. at 521.
43. Id. §§ 38(2), 42, 6 U.L.A. at 456, 521.
44. Technically the partnership may be sold as a going concern in a liquidation under
section 38(1) of the U.P.A. However, in the case of a professional firm, the princi-
pal assets of which are the partners' human capital, it is highly unlikely that
there will be any sale other than to the dissolving partners, which is the same in
effect as an agreed continuation of the partnership.
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not those related to the reputations of individual partners.45 This rule
is reinforced by cases holding that where a departing professional
partner is paid for "goodwill," this implies that the partner actually
has been paid not to compete with the firm.46
An important, illustrative case is In re Brown.47 The court held
that the executors of a deceased partner's estate could not be
surcharged for acquiescing to continuation of a stock brokerage part-
nership without payment for goodwill to partner's estate. The court
applied the conventional legal definition of goodwill as the expectancy
of future patronage.48 The test was whether a third-party purchaser
of the business would have paid the original partners anything for
goodwill.
The court said there may have been some slight value attributable
to "continuity of place," since some customers might wander by even
after the sale to third parties. But this was relevant only to one
branch of the business because the other branches were conducted on
the floor of the stock exchange by particular people and not at the
firm's principal place of business. The only other potential elements
of value were "continuity of organization," which the court said would
be negligible for such a simple business, and "continuity of name,"
which in this case would consist only of such advantage as the new
owners could get from doing business as the "successor" to the former
firm. In short, the estate was entitled to nothing associated with the
reputations of the individual partners.
Brown's reasoning is inconsistent with the conventional concept of
goodwill discussed in Part I. The firm's value actually consists of all
elements that produce the firm's earnings, including the partners' rep-
45. For cases recognizing the existence of good will based on factors other than the
partners' reputation, see Craver v. Nakagama, 94 N.C. App. 158, 379 S.E.2d 658,
appeal denied, 325 N.C. 270, 384 S.E.2d 514 (1989)(name of partnership's funeral
home was asset for value of which continuing partners must account); Schoen v.
J.C. Bradford & Co., 642 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982)(goodwill of bro-
kerage firm attributable to "value of assets 'in place,' 'assembled,' for use by a
going concern, and not as separate items"); Berg v. Settle, 70 Wash. App. 684, 425
P.2d 635 (1967)(income generated from X-ray equipment). See also Spaulding v.
Benenate, 57 N.Y.2d 418, 456 N.Y.S.2d 733, 442 N.E.2d 1244 (1982)(goodwill based
on location in sole practice). Note that these cases mistakenly attribute "good-
will" to specific assets. See supra text following note 17.
For authorities holding that goodwill associated with the particular partners is
not property of a professional partnership, see Siddall v. Keating, 8 A.D.2d 44,185
N.Y.S.2d 630 (1950), affd, 7 N.Y.2d 846, 196 N.Y.S.2d 986, 164 N.E.2d 860 (1959);
Jackson v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d 81, 415 P.2d 667 (1966); Laube, Good Will in
Professional Partnerships, 12 CoRNELL L.Q. 303 (1927).
46. See Brown v. Benzinger, 118 Md. 29,84 A. 632 (1912); Mohawk Maintenance Co. v.
Kessler, 52 N.Y.2d 276, 437 N.Y.S.2d 646, 419 N.E.2d 324 (1981); Crane, Partner-
ship Goodwill, 18 VA. L. REV. 651, 656-57 (1932).
47. 242 N.Y. 1, 150 N.E. 581 (1926).
48. See supra text accompanying note 16.
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utations. In other words, merely because goodwill is associated with
individual partners, it is not necessarily personal goodwill.4 9 That a
third party purchasing the firm from the partners would not acquire
elements of value attributable to the partners personally is true but
irrelevant. Brown involved the valuation of a single deceased part-
ner's interest. While this partner's death may have affected the value
of the firm,50 the firm was basically intact and the interest was being
purchased by the continuing partners.
Brown makes more sense in light of the fact that partner compen-
sation must be subtracted in determining firm goodwill.51 In a small
partnership like the one involved in Brown, perhaps the partners are
being compensated fully for their human capital contributions. If so,
no value attributable to the partners' efforts is firm goodwill. In
Brown the deceased had been receiving fifteen percent of the profits
prior to his death without rendering any services. This percentage
could have been either a form of deferred compensation for earlier
services or an indication of the partners' ownership interests derived,
for example, from organization, location, or monitoring of non-partner
employees.
Except to the extent the courts are precluded by ethical rules gov-
erning lawyers,52 the default rule applied in Brown can be overridden
by express or implied agreement, 53 as where the partners agreed to a
purchase price for goodwill.54 Thus, the principal question in this con-
text is whether the denial of professional partnership goodwill is a
suitable default rule.
Although the cases generally hold that professional partnerships
do not own goodwill in the sense of the partners' reputations, with-
drawing professional partners have been held entitled to share in fees
for "work-in-process," including legal cases begun prior to dissolution
and completed and paid for afterward.55 Except after a partner's
death, the partners are paid on the same basis as if the partnership had
49. See supra subsection I.A.2.
50. In fact, the effect was minimal because the partner had been inactive for years
prior to his death, which was reflected in a reduction of his interest.
51. See supra text accompanying note 32.
52. See infra section III.F.
53. In fact, it is not clear in Brown whether the court was applying a default rule or a
custom agreement. The court pointed out that incoming members paid nothing
for goodwill, and that a partner had retired without being paid for goodwill. In re
Brown, 242 N.Y. 1, 11, 150 N.E. 581, 584 (1926).
54. See Stefanski v. Gonnella, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 500,446 N.E.2d 734 (1983). A partner
may also be entitled to payment for agreeing not to compete. See Evans v. Gun-
nip, 36 Del. Ch. 589, 135 A.2d 128 (1957). See also supra text accompanying note
46 (non-competition agreement implied from "goodwill" payment).
55. See Jewel v. Boxer, 151 Cal. App. 3d 171, 199 Cal. Rptr. 273, modified, 156 Cal.
App. 3d 178,203 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1984); Fox v. Abrams, 163 Cal. App. 3d 610,210 Cal.
Rptr. 260 (1985); Ellerby v. Spiezer, 138 Ill. App. 3d 77, 485 N.E.2d 413 (1985).
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not dissolved, without any credit for extra work done by the complet-
ing partners. 56 Like future business from the same client, or from
other clients attracted by the firm's reputation, the fee from work-in-
process is only an expectation at the time of dissolution contingent on
the client's choosing not to discharge the firm. Thus, it is not clear
why the courts do not treat work-in-process like goodwill.
B. Partnership Goodwill in Divorce Cases
A partner's spouse often claims that partnership goodwill is an as-
set eligible for equitable distribution on divorce. The law on this issue
is rapidly developing and the courts have reached divergent results.
Many divorce cases clearly refuse to make a property award based on
personal goodwill.57
Analysis of the remaining cases is complicated by the fact that the
courts often conclude that goodwill exists without precisely defining
or attempting to value it.5s The cases that have recognized the exist-
ence of goodwill in professional partnerships 59 are not necessarily in-
consistent either with the conventional concept of goodwill or with
56. See U.P.A. § 18(f), 6 U.L.A. 1, 213 (1969).
57. For cases excluding any goodwill arising out of the professionals' personal reputa-
tions, see Powell v. Powell, 231 Kan. 456, 648 P.2d 218 (1982); Depner v. Depner,
478 So. 2d 532 (La. Ct. App. 1985); De Masi v. De Masi, 366 Pa. Super. 19,530 A.2d
871 (1987); Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761 (Teax. 1972); Hirsch v. Hirsch, 770 S.W.2d
674 (Mo. App. 1989)(goodwill excludes value of non-competition agreement).
Other cases reach substantially the same result by accepting as evidence of
value only the market value of the practice if sold by the professionals. A leading
case is Austin v. Austin, 619 S.W.2d 290 (Teax. Civ. App. 1981)(spouse could share
in the proceeds of the sale of a medical practice, in the absence of any evidence
that part of the value was attributable to pre-marriage clients or to a non-compe-
tition agreement). For other cases, see Wilson v. Wilson, 294 Ark. 194,741 S.W.2d
640 (1987); Hanson v. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Civ. App. 1987). For a discus-
sion of the problems of market valuation of good will, see text accompanying
notes 21-22 above.
58. For a good example of such a case, see Sorenson v. Sorenson, 769 P.2d 820 (Utah
1989), in which the majority held, over a strong dissent, that the court could rec-
ognize the existence of goodwill even if it was difficult to value.
59. See Mitchell v. Mitchell, 152 Ariz. 317, 732 P.2d 208 (1987); In re Marriage of Fon-
stein, 17 Cal. 3d 738,131 Cal. Rptr. 873,552 P.2d 1169 (1976); Golden v. Golden, 270
Cal. App. 2d 401,75 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1969); In re Marriage of Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d
577, 117 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1974); Mueller v. Mueller, 144 Cal. App. 2d 245, 301 P.2d 90
(1956); Bush v. Bush, 191 Ill. App. 3d 249, 547 N.E.2d 590 (1989); Ford v. Ford, 782
P.2d 1304 (Nev. 1989); Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975); Weaver v.
Weaver, 72 N.C. App. 409,324 S.E.2d 915 (1985); Bucld v. Buckl, 373 Pa. Super. 521
542 A.2d 55 (1988); Sorenson v. Sorenson, 769 P.2d 820 (Utah. 1989); Annotation,
Divorce and Separation. Goodwill in Medical or Dental Practice as Property
Subject to Distribution on Dissolution of Marriage, 76 A.L.RL4th 1025 (1990); An-
notation, Accountability for Goodwill of Professional Practice in Actions Arising
from Divorce or Separation 52 A.LR.3d 1344 (1973); Annotation, Evaluation of
Interest in Law Firm or Medical Partnership for Purposes of Division of Prp-
erty in Divorce Proceedings, 74 A.L.R3d 613 (1975).
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partner withdrawal cases such as Brown.o There would also be no
inconsistency if a court recognized the existence of goodwill attributa-
ble to the reputations of individual partners,6 1 since there may be
some partnership goodwill arising out of the residual left after com-
pensating the partners.62
There is, however, evidence that at least some courts are willing to
include in partnership goodwill value that would be considered per-
sonal goodwill under the conventional view. In these cases, partners'
spouses have been awarded, under the guise of "partnership goodwill,"
amounts that are actually attributable to the value of the partners'
human capital.63
First, some cases recognize the existence of goodwill in sole prac-
tices, in which it is highly unlikely that any residual claim would re-
main after compensation of the professional owner.64 Second, many
divorce cases use the capitalized earnings approach for valuing part-
nership goodwill in a way that easily can result in giving the spouse an
interest in personal goodwill. Under this approach, the partner
spouse's goodwill interest is computed by (1) determining the part-
ner's average compensation; (2) subtracting an annual return on the
partnership's tangible assets and compensation for a professional com-
parable to the partner spouse; and (3) capitalizing the product to de-
termine an asset value.65
This approach is inconsistent with the conventional meaning of
goodwill because it is based on the cash flows of a particular partner
rather than those of the firm. A partner's actual profit percentage and
60. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
61. See, eg., Ford v. Ford, 782 P.2d 1304 (Nev. 1989); In re Marriage of Hall, 103 Wash.
2d 236, 692 P.2d 175 (1984).
62. See supra subsection LA.2.
63. For commentary recognizing this, see Friedman, supra note 13; Parkman, supra
note 7.
64. See Dugan v. Dugan, 92 N.J. 423, 457 A.2d 1 (1983); In re Marriage of Steinbren-
ner, 60 Or. App. 106, 652 P.2d 845 (1982); In re Marriage of Lukens, 16 Wash. App.
481, 558 P.2d 279 (1976).
65. See Dugan v. Dugan, 92 N.J. 423, 457 A.2d 1 (1983); Levy v. Levy, 164 N.J. Super.
542, 397 A.2d 374 (1978); In re Marriage of Hall, 103 Wash. 2d 236, 692 P.2d 175
(1984); 2 VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY § 23.05[2][b], at
23-67 to -69 (1988); Friedman, supra note 13; Kline, Firm Valuation: Picking the
Appropriate Formula, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 15, 1990, at 15; Raggio, Professional Good-
will and Professional Licenses as Property Subject to Distribution Upon Mar-
riage, 16 FAM. L.Q. 147 (1982); Warner, Savey & Sailors, Theory and Evaluation
of Business and Professional Good Will Upon Dissolution, Contest or General
Sale in Washington State, 23 GoNz. L. REv. 113 (1987). For a discussion of capi-
talization, see text accompanying note 23 above. The significant difference be-
tween a capitalized earnings approach and one relying on market valuation is
indicated by In re Marriage of Fortier, 34 Cal. App. 3d 384, 109 Cal. Rptr. 915
(1973), in which the capitalized earnings value of $294,000 was almost thirty times
the market valuation.
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her comparable compensation level may reflect the firm's allocation of
total compensation dollars among the partners rather than partners'
asset shares.66 Unlike the residual between compensation and total
cash flows that constitutes conventional goodwill, this "goodwill" does
not necessarily result from the inability to separate out the individ-
ual's compensation and her ownership interest.6 7 Rather, it may result
from the firm's decision to reduce the partners' risk by disengaging
their compensation from the fluctuating value of their human capi-
tal.68 This difference from conventional goodwill is significant for the
practical reason that the disparity between compensation levels and
contributions to cash flow is likely to disappear over the long run.
Thus, this approach may result in a spousal award that exaggerates a
temporary health or market factor affecting the value of a partner's
human capital.69
Even aside from these differences from the conventional view of
goodwill, application of the capitalized earnings approach inherently
invites evaluators to make awards based on personal goodwill because
they cannot derive the partners' actual compensation which must be
subtracted from cash flows to determine partnership goodwill.70 Be-
cause it is never clear which professionals or which salaries to use as
comparables, a court may be tempted to look at average compensation
levels.71 This approach inappropriately incorporates in partnerhip
goodwill all value attributable to the partner's exceptional skills.72
The concept of goodwill in the divorce cases is significantly broader
not only than the conventional view, but also than that applied in the
partner withdrawal cases. Those cases resolve doubts about the exist-
ence of personal goodwill by going to the other extreme of excluding
any value attributable to the partners' skills and reputation.73 The
difference between the divorce and withdrawal cases is particularly
clear in those divorce cases which let the non-partner spouse share in
partnership goodwill even when the partnership agreement explicitly
66. Ironically, this means that the more mediocre partners are assigned the highest
asset values. See Friedman, supra note 13, at 26.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 35-38.
68. Risk-bearing reasons for departing from incentive-based compensation will be
discussed in section II.B below.
69. Even if this method determined only partnership goodwill, it may not accurately
measure the share of an individual partner in that goodwill because a partner's
share in the firm's assets may differ from her income percentage. For example, a
new partner may receive a high income percentage but a relatively small with-
drawable asset share. Part III discusses considerations applying to determination
of withdrawing partners' asset shares.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 35-38.
71. See Dugan v. Dugan, 92 N.J. 423, 457 A.2d 1 (1983).
72. See Friedman, supra note 13, at 27.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 45-51.
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denies the partner such an interest on withdrawal from the firm.74
The differences between the conventional concept of goodwill and
the rules applied in the partner withdrawal and divorce cases raise the
question whether factors other than the accounting concept of good-
will explain the legal rules. The following two Parts identify alterna-
tive considerations that may be operating in these cases.
III. A POLICY ANALYSIS OF COMPENSATION OF
PROFESSIONAL PARTNERS
Parts I and II show that the conventional accounting approach to
valuing professional partnership goodwill leads to a blind alley in
terms of valuation and fails to explain the legal rules governing with-
drawing partners and partners' spouses. This Part discusses an alter-
native method of determining the partners' rights to partnership
goodwill.75 Courts should view the professional firm, like other firms,
as a nexus of contracts between the partners and others as factors of
production. 76 Under this view, the appropriate question is how the
partners would define their property rights so as to minimize their
total contracting costs.
The answer to this question turns on how to minimize the total of
four different types of costs of doing business in the partnership that
are discussed in this Part: shirking;, risk-bearing costs; the costs of de-
termining the parties' rights under the contract; and opportunism.
This Part will cover the effect of each type of cost both on partners'
periodic payments as active members of the firm and payments to de-
ceased, withdrawing or otherwise dissociating partners.77 Although
74. See Mitchell v. Mitchell, 152 Ariz. 317, 732 P.2d 208 (1987); Molloy v. Molloy, 158
Ariz. 64, 761 P.2d 138 (Ariz. App. 1988); In re Marriage of Slater, 100 Cal. App. 3d
241,160 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1979); Keith v. Keith, 763 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. Civ. App. 1989);
In re Marriage of Hall, 103 Wash. 2d 236, 692 P.2d 175 (1984); In re Marriage of
Brooks, 51 Wash. App. 882, 756 P.2d 161 (1988). But see McCabe v. McCabe, 543
A.2d 558 (1988)(disallowing wife amount for goodwill because not allowed to hus-
band under law partnership agreement).
75. This Part of the Article provides a way to determine the partners' rights on with-
drawal to the firm's value in excess of the value of specific assets-that is, what is
conventionally termed "goodwill." In addition to the rights described in this
Part, the partners would also be entitled to return of their capital contributions
and other rights to specific partnership assets.
76. Some important articles expressing this view include Alchian & Demsetz, Pro-
duction, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777
(1972); Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMYCA 386 (1937); Fama, Agency
Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 290 (1980); Jensen &
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Owner-
ship Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
77. For convenience, "withdrawing" as used below refers to partners dissociating by
all methods, and not limited to voluntary withdrawal. However, as is discussed
below in the text accompanying note 121, it may be appropriate to vary partners'
rights according to the type of the dissociation.
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this Article is concerned mainly with payments to withdrawing part-
ners, it is necessary to discuss methods for determining periodic pay-
ments in order fully to understand the considerations relating to
withdrawal payments.
A. Shirking
"Shirking" refers to the tendency of members of an organization to
expend less effort than the amount that would maximize the parties'
joint "profit"-that is, revenue less the cost of the effort. This section
will show how partners' periodic and withdrawal compensation can be
designed to minimize shirking.
1. Periodic Payments
To understand shirking and its role in determining partner com-
pensation, it is helpful to begin with the Alchian-Demsetz theory that
parties organize into firms in order to take advantage of the benefits of
team production.TS The typical professional partnership is a good il-
lustration of this theory. Professionals join together in a firm at least
partly79 because their joint product exceeds what the partners could
produce in separate firms. The extra joint product might result from
partners' complementary strengths and weaknesses. For example,
some law partners may be particularly good at producing new business
while others are better at servicing the clients. Or a "full-service"
firm combining partners with different specialties may be more attrac-
tive to some clients than "boutique" firms that can advise on only one
or two of a client's problems. Even a firm offering only one specialty,
such as litigation, may offer a better product to some clients than a
sole practitioner because several lawyers are better than one for han-
dling large cases, or because different skills are needed for different
aspects of a single case. There are also team production benefits from
inputs other than the professionals themselves, including secretaries
and computers.
But there is an offsetting cost of team production. Because the
firm's product is inherently the result of joint effort, it is costly or
impossible precisely to measure the contribution of each team mem-
ber. This measurement problem gives team members, including pro-
fessional partners, the incentive to contribute less effort than they
would if their contributions to the total could be measured accurately.
In other words, the team members have the incentive to shirk.
Firms can minimize shirking and so increase productivity through
78. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 76.
79. Other reasons include risk diversification. See infra text accompanying notes 99-
108.
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"monitors" who observe, reward and punish team members.8 0 To en-
sure that the monitors do their jobs, they are rewarded by a share of
"profits"-that is, what is left over after fixed payments to team mem-
bers. The monitors can maximize their profit shares by minimizing
shirking.
Professional partners act as monitors of the other contributors to
the firm, ranging from suppliers of office products through secretaries
to associates or other non-partner professionals.8 1 By keeping a
watchful eye, the partners increase productivity and thereby their
profit-shares. Among other things, the partners keep track of the
number of hours other professionals work, based on the assumption
that hours worked is directly correlated with productivity. Lawyers
keep careful time records for billing purposes, and there is evidence
that partners also use these records for monitoring purposes.8 2 Obser-
vation of time worked may be an approximate measure of the work of
lower-level associates who are more equal in abilities and who do
more routine work than partners.
Professional partners are themselves team members as well as
monitors. Controlling shirking by the partners presents special
problems because it is difficult to evaluate professionals' work simply
by observing it. For example, one lawyer may quickly create an in-
sightful legal theory or write a brilliant brief while another labors
fruitlessly over legal research or less artful drafting. Thus, the costs
of hiring specialized monitors are likely to exceed the benefits. As a
result, the partners must observe each other.
The partners also can devise methods such as incentive compensa-
tion to constrain shirking. If the partners equally divide the profits,
each has a significant incentive to shirk, particularly if there are many
partners, because each partner's benefits from shirking will exceed
her share of the reduction in total profits.83 Shirking in professional
firms can be reduced by compensating partners on the basis of each
partner's contribution to the joint product of the firm.8 4 The main
problem with this approach is that it is difficult to calibrate profit
80. See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 76, at 781-83.
81. For an empirical analysis of monitoring of non-professional inputs in law firms,
see Leibowitz & Tollison, Free Riding, Shirking, and Team Production in Legal
Partnerships, 18 ECON. INQUIRY 380 (1980).
82. See McChesney, Team Production, Monitoring and Profit-Sharing in Law Firms:
An Alternative Hypothesis, 11 J. LEGAL STuD. 379 (1982). The evidence includes
a high correlation between hours billed and compensation and the fact that asso-
ciates, who have more incentive to shirk because they do not share profits, keep
more complete time records than partners.
83. See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 76, at 780.
84. For a similar conclusion as to top management compensation, see Jensen & Mur-
phy, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225
(1990).
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share to effort precisely because much of senior professionals' work
cannot be readily evaluated.85
Fred McChesney argues that, in law firms at least, partners' com-
pensation is aligned with their most important contribution to firm
productivity-the production of new business.86 But it is very diffi-
cult to measure a partner's promotional contribution. A firm's ability
to attract and retain business is a function not only of the partners'
individual promotion efforts but also of the firm's general reputation.
Reputation, in turn, rests on such factors as publicity, the quality of
the partners' work and the firm's success in training and recruiting
new partners. The importance of reputation to business promotion
and the difficulty of measuring each partner's contribution to reputa-
tion means that it is impossible precisely to calibrate partners' profit
participation to their business promotion. As a result, this form of
compensation can perversely encourage partners to put too much ef-
fort into direct client contacts'and insufficient effort into general rep-
utation-building.8 7
The difficulty of providing appropriate incentives for professional
partners has led firms to experiment with different types of compen-
sation schemes, incorporating various factors relating to partners' con-
tributions to the firm.88 Most systems, rather than attempting to
compensate in terms of the partner's specific contribution in the pre-
ceding period, use the preceding period's performance as a basis for
adjusting the partner's profit share for the next period.
85. See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 35, at 348-50. This is also a problem with Jen-
sen and Murphy's marginal product approach to compensation in the chief execu-
tive officer context- it is very difficult to isolate the contribution of the chief
executive officer from those of other team members. See Jensen & Murphy,
supra note 84.
86. See McChesney, supra note 82.
87. See Hildebrandt, Compensation for Partners-Problems with Formula Systems,
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 4, col. 1; Masters, Economy Promotes Experiments with
Profit-Splitting Methods, Legal Times, Dec. 13, 1982, at 1, col. 3.
88. See, e.g., M. ALTMAN & R. WEL, INTRODUCTION TO LAW PRACTICE MANAGEMENT
§§ 5.01-.15 (1987); Basile & Sandbach, Practical Aspects to Implementing the
Profit Center Concept ofIncome Distribution, 7 LEGAL EcoN., May-June 1981, at
37; Cantor, Dividing Firm Income in the 1980s, 23 LAw OFFICE ECON. & MGMT.
191 (1982); Heintz, New Trends in Partner Profit Distribution, 55 Wis. B. BULL.,
Oct. 1982, at 24 (identifying relevant factors in designing profit distribution sys-
tem); Lyons, Baker & McKenzie, The Belittled Giant, Am. LAw., Oct. 1985, at 118
(partners of largest law firm in United States receive 75% of collected billings for
their own work; 12% of billings originated by partner and a share of remaining
net income divided by "points" determined by partner seniority); Rachlin, Evalu-
ating and Rewarding Partners, 2 LEGAL ECON., Fall 1976, at 12 (explaining
"three-tier" profit distribution system based on a combination of salary, points,
and equal sharing); Rose, A Plan for Distributing Profits of Law Firm, N.Y.L.J.,
June 25,1985, at 4, col. 1; Stille, Turning to Two-TierPartnerships, Nat'l L.J., Oct.
22, 1984, at 14, col. 1.
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No system so perfectly calibrates rewards that it can prevent part-
ner shirking. Indeed, even the most perfectly calibrated compensation
system would not eliminate shirking. Professional firms tend to be
larger than other partnerships,8 9 which means that there are many
monitors and team members and therefore a greater possibility that
each will free-ride on the efforts of others.90 A system that is per-
fectly calibrated to reward partner productivity may actually en-
courage shirking with regard to monitoring other inputs, since a
partner with a relatively low profit share has even less incentive to
control costs than one with a large profit share.91
Despite these problems with compensation design, it remains true
that the closer the compensation system comes to paying the partners
in terms of their contribution to the firm's product, the more that sys-
tem will deter shirking.
Finally, it is important to note that incentive compensation is not
the exclusive method of constraining shirking. First, the market for
professionals' services fills a gap in the firm's compensation by provid-
ing ex post settling up.92 Second, shirking can be disciplined directly
through expulsion. Third, if partners attempt to free-ride on the ef-
forts of their co-partners, the hard-working co-partners can withdraw
and seek other employment that will fully compensate their efforts.
Of course, these devices are not perfect constraints. Because of diffi-
culties of evaluating professionals' work, the employment market pro-
vides only rough settling up. Expulsion, because of its severe effect on
the expelled partner, will only be provided for in the event of the most
extreme forms of shirking. And the parties may wish to limit the
right of exit because easy exit facilitates opportunistic conduct.93 But
these alternative constraints are relevant in evaluating whether the
costs of incentive compensation discussed below in section B outweigh
the costs of any additional shirking that would result from abandoning
incentive compensation.
89. This may be partly because large firms facilitate diversification of human capital
risks. See infra text accompanying notes 100-02.
90. See Leibowitz & Tollison, supra note 81 (showing how such free-riding increases
the costs even of relatively small law firms).
91. On the other hand, varying profit shares among partners may increase monitor-
ing efficiency by causing the more highly compensated partners to be monitoring
specialists, while discouraging other partners from engaging in redundant moni-
toring. See Mathewson, The Economics of Law Firms: A Study in the Legal Or-
ganization of the Firm, 33 J.L. & ECON. 307 (1990)(explaining seniority-based
compensation on the basis that monitoring is concentrated in senior partners).
The specialization of monitoring has also been suggested as a justification for se-
cured credit. See generally, Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priori-
ties Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979); Levmore, Monitors and
Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49 (1982).
92. See Fama, supra note 76.
93. See infra text accompany notes 118-20.
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2. Withdrawal Compensation
Incentive compensation of partners includes not only periodic com-
pensation during employment, but also compensation paid to the part-
ner on withdrawal. In other words, from the standpoint of inimizing
shirking, the payment for goodwill could be characterized as settling
out any remaining incentive compensation that the partner has not
already been paid. Such settling out may be necessary for one or more
of several reasons. First, the firm may deliberately defer some incen-
tive compensation until the partner has reached a certain age or ten-
ure with the firm in order to deter withdrawal.
Second, even if the periodic payments perfectly match the part-
ners' contributions, some withdrawal payment is necessary to settle
out amounts earned since the last periodic payment. These amounts
are larger the longer are the compensation periods. This particularly
affects "lame duck" partners who know they will be leaving prior to
the next compensation period.
Third, the problems of ascribing partner efforts to particular peri-
ods may justify a withdrawal payment that reflects expected cash
flows attributable to the partner's pre-departure efforts.94 Such ef-
forts, including participation in management and recruitment and
training of new partners, may not pay off for several years in terms of
new business or higher rates. If partners are not paid on withdrawal
for this expected payoff, they will have the incentive to focus on short-
term payoffs for which they are compensated periodically. This par-
ticularly affects the incentives of partners who know they might soon
leave the firm because, for example, they are nearing retirement. But
it applies in some measure to all partners, since none can be certain
how long they will continue to work for the firm.
Fourth, withdrawal payments can reduce shirking by compensat-
ing leaving partners for the difference between the value of the part-
ner's human capital in the firm and the value outside it-that is, for
the value of the partner's "firm-specific" human capital. An example
might be knowledge or skills relating to the specialized business and
legal problems of a particular law firm's clients. A professional who
develops such skills rather than more generally marketable skills may
be worth more in the firm than outside of it. This enables the firm to
earn "quasi-rents" by employing the partner and not adjusting the
partner's compensation to reflect firm-specific capital.95 In the ab-
94. This form of withdrawal compensation can be characterized as assigning to part-
ners a transferable property right in all cash flows attributable to their efforts.
The withdrawing partner in effect sells this right to the continuing partners.
95. For seminal writings developing this basic concept, see 0. WILIAMSON, MARKETS
AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLIcATIONS 26-30 (1975); Klein,
Crawford & Alchian, supra note 9. Klein, Crawford and Alchian say that law
firms are formed because lawyers' work is "highly specialized to each other," so
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sence of appropriately structured withdrawal compensation, the pro-
fessional may forestall this potential opportunism through a form of
shirking-that is, refusing to invest in efforts to create firm-specific
human capital although such efforts may benefit the firm.9
It is important to note that the conventional accounting approach
to goodwill, in addition to its practical problems in terms of valuation,
does not provide the sort of constraint on shirking identified in this
section. Under the conventional approach, payment to a withdrawing
partner is based solely on some difference between hypothetical part-
ner compensation and total partnership cash flows. 9 7 In order to max-
imize their interests in goodwill under this method, partners would
have some incentive to minimize the value of their services as long as
the resulting reduction in periodic compensation was less than the ex-
pected gain in withdrawal compensation. This would provide signifi-
cant perverse incentives to partners who were in their final periods
before retirement, or who worked in firms that compensated periodi-
cally based on factors other than on the partners' productivity.9 8
B. Risk-bearing Costs
Professionals' returns on the human capital they invest in a profes-
sional partnership are, like other investments, subject to risk. This
that the lawyers need a contract that precludes individual partners from appro-
priating value. Id. at 323 n.51. One such arrangement might include withdrawal
compensation. For applications to corporate chief executives, see Haddock, Ma-
cey & McChesney, Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers, 73
VA. L. REV. 701 (1987); Johnson, Magee, Nagarajian & Newman, supra note 30.
One way a professional can avoid this problem is to be in a position to take
clients along when she leaves the firm. However, these clients might become
"property" of a particular firm which withdrawing lawyers cannot easily take
with them. See infra text accompanying notes 113-15.
96. Note that this form of compensation is based on the partners' contributions to the
firm's past earnings rather than erpected earnings as with the other compensa-
tion forms discussed immediately above.
Compensating a partner on account of firm-specific human capital is analo-
gous to the structuring of "golden parachute" contracts for corporate executives.
These contracts commonly provide for substantial severance pay for executives
displaced by takeover. Golden parachutes have been explained partly as a way of
ensuring that the executives are paid for human capital contributions to the crea-
tion of firm value that have not been fully rewarded by their periodic compensa-
tion and that the employees cannot take with them when they leave the firm.
The promise of this severance compensation induces the employees ex ante to
contribute firm-specific human capital. See Knoeber, Golden Parachutes, Shark
Repellents and Hostile Tender Offers, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 155 (1986). For discus-
sions of takeover defenses as an alternative solution to the problem of share-
holder appropriation of executives' contributions to the firm, see Coffee,
Shareholders vs. Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1
(1986); Haddock, Macey & McChesney, supra note 95.
97. See supra text accompanying note 35.
98. Non-productivity-based compensation is discussed in the next section.
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risk is a real cost to risk-averse partners that they would seek to mini-
mize or be compensated for. This section will show that compensating
the partners so as to minimize shirking may actually increase part-
ners' riskbearing costs.
1. Periodic Payments
Compensating the partners so as to minimize shirking exposes
partners to the risk that their contributions to the firm's joint product
may decline because of factors beyond their control. In particular, the
partners' specialty may suffer from economy-wide shifts relative to
other specialties. Or a client that has produced much of the partner's
contribution to the firm's income may cease operations or leave the
firm for reasons wholly unrelated to the partner's effort. Thus, there
may be a tension between risk-bearing and shirking costs.99
Gilson and Mnookin have argued that profit-sharing in some large
law firms is structured to reduce risk rather than to reward partners'
contributions to the firm's joint product.100 They point out that many
large law firms pay partners a profit share based solely on their sen-
iority in the firm.'0 ' Thus, income produced by securities lawyers in a
rising economy balances bankruptcy lawyers' slow times. By joining
in a single firm and sharing on a seniority basis, the two types of law-
yers in effect hold different specialties in a human capital portfolio. In
this way they diversify away some of the risk of financial shock to
their own human capital.102
Gilson and Mnookin argue that the shirking costs of such a senior-
99. In non-professional firms the tension may be between two types of agency costs.
Paying fixed salaries may increase equity's agency cost by reducing managers'
incentives to maximize profits, but it tends to decrease creditors' agency costs by
aligning the interests of creditors and managers. Managers on fixed salaries, like
creditors, bear insolvency risk (from potential loss of firm-specific human capital
investments) while not sharing in favorable results of risky strategies. But this
sort of creditors' agency cost is rarely significant in professional firms because
such firms ordinarily are not highly leveraged and do not adopt risky manage-
ment strategies.
100. See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 35.
101. While Gilson and Mnookin's discussion is based on law firms, there is no reason
why it cannot be generalized to other professional firms, including accounting,
advertising and investment banking, involving substantial investments of partner
human capital in specific areas of expertise and a risk that changing economic
conditions will devalue these investments. For an alternative explanation for
seniority-based compensation, see Mathewson, supra note 91.
102. Gilson and Mnookin offer their theory partly as an explanation of why some law
firms are larger than seems justified by economies of scale. However, as they
note, human capital risk theoretically could be reduced by going public and
spreading the risk among capital investors. See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 35,
at 329-30 n.30. The principal problem with this solution is that shirking costs
probably would be very high unless the lawyers were paid something like their
marginal products-either by structuring compensation within the firm or
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ity-based system can be minimized other than by productivity-based
profit-sharing. Shirking can be reduced to some extent through direct
monitoring of hours worked10 3 and by developing through training
and recruitment a firm "culture" of conscientiousness.104 Gilson and
Mnookin reason that seniority compensation can actually reduce
shirking as compared with a productivity measure because partners
compensated on a seniority basis will be more likely to develop the
firm's rather than their own relationships with clients.
Partners' risk is also affected by the length of the compensation
periods. If partners were compensated only every few years, there
might be jolting period-to-period fluctuations resulting from, among
other things, changes in the value of the partners' human capital.
More frequent pay periods may "smooth" these jolts.105 Because part-
ners' promotional efforts and contributions to the firm's reputation
take some time to be reflected in earnings, changes in partner produc-
tivity occur slowly through successive pay periods rather than in large
increments.
2. Withdrawal Compensation
Unlike incentive-based compensation, seniority-based periodic
compensation provides no clear basis for computing the withdrawing
partner's share of expected cash flows. A simple approach would be to
apply the active partner's percentage to post-withdrawal expected
through "ex post settling up" in the lawyers' job market. This would lead back to
the problem of undiversified human capital risk.
Some professional-type firms do go public. The practice is common in adver-
tising and brokerage firms, and there is even a recent report of its extension to an
accounting firm. See supra note 34. Capital contributors to these firms are com-
pensated at least partly on the basis of returns to financial and other non-human
capital. Moreover, in advertising and brokerage firms, shirking by professionals
may be more observable, so that such firms may be able to constrain shirking
other than through incentive compensation.
103. However, as discussed in the text accompanying note 85 above, observing hours
worked is a less satisfactory way of reducing shirking as the professional's work
becomes more sophisticated.
Because a strict hours-worked formula is sensitive to economic conditions, ap-
plication of such a formula would reduce diversification. Gilson and Mnookin,
therefore, suggest application of a system that would distinguish reduction in
hours worked by shirking from that caused by changing economic conditions. See
Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 35, at 373.
104. Id. at 375-79.
105. Retained earnings may increase agency costs because managers may invest undis-
tributed cash at a lower rate of return than the partners' would have earned if the
funds had been distributed. For example, managers may buy lavish office space.
But this agency problem is probably lower in a professional partnership than in a
publicly traded corporation because managing and non-managing partners have
common interests in how the money is invested, and because partners are in-
volved more directly in management than are public corporation shareholders.
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cash flows. However, the active partner's percentage obviously is
predicated on her contribution of effort which is now being
withdrawn.
Second, a possible alternative would be to shift to an incentive ap-
proach in computing withdrawal compensation. However, this might
let partners renege on the sharing bargain by withdrawing, or forcing
renegotiation by threatening to withdraw, when their current success
would yield a high withdrawal payment. If, on the other hand, the
partner must withdraw during a down-swing in the partner's profes-
sional fortunes, this raises the risk-bearing problem discussed immedi-
ately below.
Third, withdrawing partners could be denied any interest in ex-
pected cash flows. The problem with this approach is that it would
increase risk-bearing costs because partners would bear not only those
risks associated with variability in the firm's income, but also those
connected with withdrawal. Partners who are compensated on a sen-
iority basis have, at any given time, interests in the firm's expected
earnings that include profits attributable to the other partners' efforts.
In exchange for this interest they have foregone earnings based on
their own efforts. Since there is no public market for this interest,
without withdrawal compensation the interests are forfeited on
withdrawal.
Making partners' rights contingent on non-withdrawal resembles
subjecting the partners to the risk of a coin-flip. As with a coin-flip,
the partners do not know and cannot control (1) when they will die;
(2) when exigencies will force them to withdraw unexpectedly before
death; or (3) when remaining in the firm will become costly because
another use of the professional's human capital becomes more valua-
ble on account of misconduct by or conflict with the other partners. 0 6
If a partner loses the coin-flip, the other partners "win" the profit
share that otherwise would have been paid to the losing partner.107
Assuming all of the partners must go through these periodic coin-flips,
their expected returns are the same as if they did not engage in this
106. See Ribstein, A Statutory Approach to Partner Dissociation, 65 WASH. U.L.Q. 357,
380-83 (1987)(discussing these and other costs of partner illiquidity). A partner
may remain in the firm despite these costs if the costs are less than the expected
value of future payoffs from remaining with the firm.
107. An analogy is a "tontine" in which the last living participant takes the "pot." For
example, in Shields v. Shields, 498 A.2d 161 (Del. Ch. 1985), a share transfer
agreement permitted the parties to buy the stock of any other party who wished
to sell for the amount offered by a third party, or for book value in the absence of
a third-party offer, and to buy the stock of a deceased shareholder for book value.
Because book value was only one-sixteenth of market value, and because there
was no real market for the stock, the agreement was, as the court said, a "lottery"
won by the longer-lived shareholders. The court interpreted the agreement very
restrictively, effectively allowing one side to cancel it unilaterally.
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game. But the game increases the variance of returns, since the play-
ers now have some possible zero outcomes. The partners would de-
mand to be paid to participate in this risky game. If there is no
offsetting benefit to the partners, the game will increase the firm's
operating costs.1 08
A fourth approach to withdrawal compensation under a seniority
sharing approach would be to provide for a level of withdrawal com-
pensation that is either fixed or determinable through a formula. This
amount, like periodic compensation, could increase with seniority.
This approach may be the best way of resolving the problems
presented by the other approaches discussed above. However, it is ob-
viously unsuitable as a default rule because the appropriate payment
or formula varies among firms.
In short, compensation based on seniority, while it may solve a
risk-bearing problem with incentive compensation, creates significant
difficulties in designing the appropriate level of withdrawal
compensation.
C. Administrative Costs
In determining the appropriate method of compensating partners,
it is important to consider the costs of administering the various meth-
ods. This section will show that the high administrative costs of apply-
ing an incentive-based system may offset the benefits of such a system
in constraining shirking.
1. Periodic Compensation
To apply the incentive approach discussed in section A it is neces-
sary to determine each partner's contribution to the firm's cash flows.
This is an extremely difficult task. Relatively objective measures such
as number of clients originated by a partner or billable hours provide
only very rough approximations because the value of a partner's work
is important, and because partners contribute in various ways to the
firm's reputation.109 Yet to make a precise determination the partners
must expend substantial resources to acquire information concerning
the partners' contributions to the firm.
Because of the difficulty of determining partners' contributions to
the firm's earnings, the results are subject to uncertainty, which en-
courages dispute and litigation. Moreover, the costs of each litigated
or arbitrated case are likely to be relatively high, since precise deter-
108. Similarly, inside information has been criticized as a risky, and therefore perhaps
not particularly valuable, form of executive compensation. See Easterbrook, Se-
cret Agents, Evidentiary Piivileges and the Production of Information, 1981 SuP.
CT. REv. 309, 332.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 86-87.
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mination of the partners' contributions requires a costly examination
of the basis of the firm's earnings and testimony by experts on
valuation. 1 0
2. Withdrawal Compensation
The administrative costs of paying withdrawal compensation on an
incentive basis are likely to be even greater than those of periodic
compensation because of the greater difficulty of determining the ap-
propriate level of incentive withdrawal pay.
Withdrawal pay reduces shirking if it compensates partners for
cash flows expected to be' produced by the withdrawing partner's
human capital investment.111 This amount includes profits attributa-
ble to the partner on individual projects or cases, as where the partner
contributed research or innovative legal theories to legal cases, irre-
spective of how this business originated. It also includes profits
earned from clients brought into the firm by the withdrawing part-
ner's direct efforts or because of the effect of her reputation. The
partner's indirect effect on partnership business obviously is difficult
to isolate. Moreover, the firm must separate out business that the
withdrawing partner originated but can take with her if she is not sub-
ject to a noncompetition agreement.= This may be difficult to deter-
mine at the point of withdrawal, before it is clear whether the
withdrawing partner or the firm will win the competition for the cli-
ent's business.
After the firm has attributed certain categories of revenues to a
particular partner, it must compute the precise portion of the fee to be
credited to the withdrawing partner. This includes an allocation of
110. For discussions of other areas in which clear rules may be appropriate for similar
reasons, see Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of
Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669,699 (1984) (mandatory disclosure rules may be pref-
erable to common law fraud regime because of uncertain application of fraud
rules); Ribstein, Takeover Defenses and the Corporate Contract, 78 GEo. L.J. 71,
114-16 (1989)(stating that attempts to determine managers' duties on a case-by-
case basis by means of a broad fiduciary duty rule may be costly).
111. See supra text accompanying note 94. Shirking is also reduced by compensating
partners for developing firm-specific human capital. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 95-96. Computation of this amount presents additional difficulties. Per-
haps the firm could make up the difference between the partner's expected
compensation in the firm and her highest expected compensation outside the
firm. But the entire difference is probably not attributable to firm-specific
human capital. Indeed, compensation in the partner's present firm may simply
not have been adjusted to reflect the partner's reduced abilities. Compensating
partners for the difference between their pay in and outside the firm would elimi-
nate the possibility of resolving this problem through ex post settling up in the
market for professional services.
112. The partner's ability to take clients is discussed further in the text accompanying
notes 113-14 below.
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the fee between the partner who brought in the business and the part-
ners who did the work, and between the partner who began a case and
the partners who completed it. To illustrate the difficulty, a with-
drawing legal partner may have developed an innovative theory in a
case, but the case might have been won on other grounds.
The problems just discussed of separating out the withdrawer's
human capital contributions to the firm's expected earnings are in ad-
dition to those of capitalizing the cash flows of the firm as a whole, or
cash flows attributable to particular clients or cases. These problems
are considerable, since it is impossible to predict precisely how long a
client will remain with the firm, or what fees will be generated by
particular clients and projects or cases.
Although it is likely to be very costly to value the withdrawing
partner's property right in expected cash flows under an incentive-
based approach, the partners might want to assign a positive value to
this right as a constraint on shirking. The partners might choose a
formula-for example, a multiple of the withdrawing partner's most
recent periodic distribution-that approximates this value. But such a
formula may be unsuitable as a default term since the appropriate
formula varies among firms. Thus, the court may have to deny with-
drawal compensation in the absence of an explicit agreement even if it
concludes that such compensation might have substantial benefits,
such as deterring partner shirking.
D. Opportunism Costs
A compensation system that minimizes the other costs discussed
above nevertheless may be inappropriate because it increases opportu-
nistic conduct by withdrawing or continuing partners.
1. Periodic Payments
Because of risk-bearing and administrative costs, professionals may
agree to a compensation formula that does not reflect accurately the
partners' contributions to the firm's product even if this encourages
some shirking. However, partners who have benefitted under this
formula at the expense of their co-partners by being paid more than
they contributed to the firm might, as soon as the situation reverses,
refuse to share their own contributions with their co-partners. For
example, a lawyer whose specialty is out of favor may share in bounty
produced by partners whose services are more in demand. When the
economy changes the lawyer may leave the firm with valuable clients
or jump to a firm that is willing to pay the partner based on the value
of her contribution to the new firm.
Gilson and Mnookin have argued that professional firms can re-
duce partner opportunism by ensuring that client relationships cannot
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be controlled by particular partners.1 3 They can, for example, offer
quality assurances to clients that competitors or individual partners
cannot readily duplicate. Client relationships become firm-specific in
the sense that the client incurs costs if it moves to another lawyer or
firm. This approach to client relations makes the partners' human
capital firm-specific to the extent that the partners have developed
skills uniquely valuable to the clients that are specialized to the
firm.114 These firm-based client relationships, in turn, ensure that
partners will not try to renege on the sharing bargain by leaving the
firm with clients in tow.
This analysis is incomplete, however, because it does not explain
fully why the partners would choose to create firm-specific capital.
Gilson and Mnookin argue that seniority-based compensation encour-
ages development of firm-based client relationships by reducing pro-
fessionals' incentive to develop personal clients and their own
reputations.1 5 But even under seniority-based compensation, profes-
sionals have the incentive to build their own client bases in order to
ensure the mobility of their human capital. The next subsection con-
siders whether this incentive can be reduced through withdrawal
compensation.
2. Withdrawal Compensation
Withdrawal compensation should be designed in light of the poten-
tial for opportunistic conduct both against and by withdrawing
partners.
As to opportunism against withdrawing partners, the principal
problem concerns partners who have developed human capital that is
more valuable in the firm (that is, in connection with the firm's cli-
ents) than it is outside the firm. Unless the partner is compensated
for this investment in firm-specific human capital, the other partners
can exploit the differential and pay the partner only enough to top the
competitive wage. The partner may decline to develop this sort of
specialized expertise in order to avoid being exposed to the risk of op-
portunism.1i6 One way to encourage partners to develop firm-specific
capital is to promise to compensate them on withdrawal for their spe-
cialized expertise."17
There is also a risk of opportunistic conduct by withdrawing part-
ners. Partners may be able to take with them not only their own
human capital but also the product of the other partners' contribu-
113. See Gilson & Mnookin, supm note 35, at 355-66.
114. See i. at 370-71.
115. Id. at 370.
116. See supm text accompanying notes 95-96.
117. For a discussion of administrative costs connected with such payments, see note
111 above.
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tions. The other partners may have made asset-specific investments in
client relationships and work-in-process that are controlled by the
withdrawing partners.1 18 For example, a withdrawing law partner
who takes the firm's clients also takes uncompleted cases or other
work for which the fee will accrue only after the withdrawal.119 The
fee may be determined by the final result, which is the product of
work by the other partners. Less directly, the firm may have paid the
withdrawing partners their profit shares and provided staff and other
support during an otherwise unproductive period while they worked
on the case. 12 0 The opportunity to take such assets may, in fact, en-
courage partners to develop personal client relationships even if they
are promised compensation on withdrawal for firm-specific human
capital.
Not paying withdrawing partners on account of expected earnings
is one way to discourage or offset withdrawal of assets owned by the
other partners. The problem is that such denial of compensation may
significantly increase shirking and risk-bearing costs.' 2 ' To minimize
the total of all these costs, the agreement could provide for compensa-
tion only in situations where there is little risk of opportunism by the
withdrawing partner, as on withdrawal by death or by expulsion with-
out fault of the expelled partner.
E. Conclusions Concerning the Appropriate Default Rule
The above analysis supports the current legal rule that denies
withdrawing professional partners a share of expected post-with-
drawal earnings. Although such withdrawal compensation can help
minimize shirking, risk-bearing and opportunism against withdrawing
partners, it is difficult to design a default rule that accomplishes these
objectives without imposing prohibitive administrative costs and en-
couraging opportunism by withdrawing partners.2
On the other hand, it may be feasible to provide for a limited prop-
erty right in post-withdrawal earnings that better optimizes the total
of shirking, administrative costs and opportunism than completely de-
nying such an interest. The courts have in effect adopted such a com-
118. Devices for weakening this control by individual partners are discussed above in
the text accompanying notes 113-14.
119. For a classic example of this sort of case, see Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Co-
hen, 146 Cal. App. 3d 200, 194 Cal. Rptr. 180 (1983), in which the leaving law
partners took with them a major antitrust case.
120. This appears to have been the situation in RosenfeKd, Meyer & Susran.
121. See supra subsections M.A.2 & llI.B.2.
122. Indeed, the partners may want to deny withdrawal payments on account of tangi-
ble assets or non-goodwill intangibles in order to deter opportunistic withdrawal.
For a case in which a withdrawing partner was denied an interest in a patent for
this reason, see Pay-Saver Corp. v. Vasso Corp., 143 IMI. App. 3d 1013, 493 N.E.2d
423 (1986).
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promise by permitting compensation of withdrawing professional
partners for work that was "in process" prior to the withdrawal on the
same basis as the partners would have been paid if the proceeds had
been received prior to the withdrawal.123 The work-in-process rule
seems inconsistent with the general rule denying withdrawing part-
ners a property right in goodwill. But the rule makes sense in light of
the factors discussed in Part III.
First, giving partners property interests in work-in-process mini-
mizes shirking and risk-bearing costs. All of the partners may have
invested human capital in work-in-process that was not reflected in
their periodic compensation. If the partners know they will be denied
compensation on these projects if they leave or if withdrawing co-part-
ners take the cases with them, they may concentrate their efforts on
shorter-term projects or cases for which compensation is likely to be
kept current. Moreover, the departure contingency increases the risk-
iness of partners' compensation.
The aspect of the work-in-process rule that denies extra compensa-
tion to partners who complete the work 2 4 is more troubling because it
would seem to encourage shirking by these partners vis-a-vis the cli-
ents whose cases they are completing.125 But awarding a fee to the
completing partners on an hours-worked basis may simply replace one
incentive problem with another by devaluing earlier important contri-
butions by the other partners. Moreover, potential shirking is limited
in this context by the fact that partners have the incentive to protect
their general reputations and continuing relationships with the
clients.126
The work-in-process rule resolves the problems of computing the
value of the partners' contributions 2 7 by applying the formula the
partners themselves devised to compensate for their contributions to
the going firm. Thus, the shirking and risk-bearing benefits of com-
pensating for work-in-process are not offset by administrative costs.
Nor are the benefits of compensation for work-in-process offset by op-
portunism costs. On the contrary, the work-in-process rule blocks
123. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
124. See supra text accompanying note 56.
125. See Hillman, Law Firms and Their Partners: The Law & Ethics of Grabbing and
Leaving, 67 TEx. L. REv. 1, 17, 49-50, 57 (1988); Comment, Barefoot Shoemakers:
An Uncompromising Approach to Policing the Morals of the Marketplace When
Law Firms Split Up, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 509 (1987).
126. See Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 404 Mass. 419,535 N.E.2d 1255 (1989); 2 BRoMBERG &
RIBSTEIN, supra note 10, § 7.08(e), at 7:85. Professionals, such as attorneys, also
may be constrained by ethical and fiduciary duties. See Jewel v. Boxer, 151 Cal.
App. 3d 171, 199 Cal. Rptr. 273, vacated, 156 Cal. App. 3d 178, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1984).
127. See supra subsection HI.C.2. For a case rejecting a fee based on an attempted
calculation of the value of the partners' contributions, see Jewel v. Boxer, 151
Cal. App. 3d 171, 199 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1984).
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withdrawing partners who control cases from appropriating the bene-
fits of work done on these cases by other partners.128
Although the work-in-process rule is a suitable standard form, it
does not operate perfectly in all firms. The partners may wish to con-
tract around the rule, as where they can devise a formula that more
precisely compensates for partner contributions to work-in-process.12 9
F. Opting Out of the Standard Form: Ethical Constraints
As indicated by the foregoing discussion of the work-in-process
rule, withdrawal compensation reflecting the partners' contributions
to the firm may be an appropriate term if the parties can avoid exces-
sive administrative and opportunism costs. However, agreements pro-
viding for such compensation have been held unenforceable in law
partnerships because of the ethical ban on fee-splitting.130
The justifications that have been suggested for the anti-fee-split-
ting rule are unconvincing. First, it has been said that fee-splitting
gives referring lawyers the perverse incentive to refer to the highest
bidder rather than in the client's interest. 3 1 But this argument ig-
nores the perverse incentives that practitioners have without fee-split-
ting to retain work they are not fully equipped to handle.'3 2
128. Opportunistic conduct by withdrawing partners is discussed in the text accompa-
nying notes 118-20 above.
129. For a case enforcing such an agreed formula, see Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 404
Mass. 419, 535 N.E.2d 1255 (1989)(withdrawing partner could remove any matter
he brought to the firm with client consent and payment to firm of "fair charge"
for its services and expenses).
130. For the ethical rules specifying the conditions under which lawyers in different
firms may share fees, see MODEL CODE, supra note 10, DR 2-107(A); MODEL
RULES, supra note 10, Rule 1.5(e). For cases holding unenforceable on ethical
grounds agreements providing for post-dissolution fee-sharing, see Corti v.
Fleisher, 93 Ill. App. 3d 517,417 N.E.2d 764 (1981); In re Silverberg, 75 A.D.2d 817,
427 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1980). See also Geffen v. Moss, 53 Cal. App. 3d 215, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 687 (1975)(sale of law practice unenforceable); O'Hara v. Ahlgren, Blumen-
feld & Kempster, 127 IMl. 2d 333, 537 N.E.2d 730 (1989)(voiding contract to pay
deceased attorney's wife for sale of practice). Some cases have denied withdraw-
ing attorneys an interest in goodwill in the absence of an agreement partly on
ethical grounds. See Bump v. Stewart, Wimer & Bump, P.C., 336 N.W.2d 731
(Iowa 1983); Siddal v. Keating, 8 A.D.2d 44, 185 N.Y.S.2d 630 (N.Y. App. Div.),
affd, 7 N.Y.2d 846,196 N.Y.S.2d 986,164 N.E.2d 860 (1959). Cf. Fraser v. Bogucki,
203 Cal. App. 3d 604, 250 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1988)(holding, partly on basis of ethical
fee-splitting rule, that attorney had no cause of action against former partners on
grounds they appropriated client relationships).
131. See Geffen v. Moss, 53 Cal. App. 3d 215,125 Cal. Rptr. 687 (1975); Corti v. Fleisher,
93 IlM. App. 3d 517, 417 N.E.2d 764 (1981). Cf. O'Hara v. Ahlgren, Blumenfeld &
Kempster, 127 11. 2d 333, 537 N.E.2d 730 (1989)(rule against fee sharing with non-
attorney, here, deceased attorney's wife who sold practice, would give layperson
perverse incentive to recommend buyer of practice).
132. See C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETmCS § 9.2, at 510-11 (1986); Pauly, The Ethics
and Economics of Kickbacks and Fee Splitting, 10 BELL J. ECON. 344 (1979).
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A second justification for the ban is that fee-splitting hurts the
legal profession by encouraging lawyers to act as commercial brokers
rather than legal professionals.133 This rationale helps explain why
ethical rules do not allow fee-splitting even with the client's consent.
But it is not clear that concern for the reputation of the legal profes-
sion, independent of clients' interests, justifies non-enforcement of
lawyers' agreements.
A third argument is that fee-sharing leaves lawyers without ade-
quate incentives to do the work properly.34 But there is no reason to
assume that the referee is left with so little compensation that there is
an incentive to shirk. Referees will not pay fees so high as to reduce
their net compensation below their marginal cost of rendering the ser-
vice.1 35 While they may attempt to reduce their marginal cost by ex-
pending less effort, they always have some incentive to do this in order
to maximize profit if the client cannot easily detect the shirking. In-
deed, the fact that the professional is working on referral may warn
the client to be watchful, making shirking more difficult.
Even if the fee-splitting prohibition is justified in some circum-
stances, it plainly should not be applied to bar compensation to with-
drawing partners.136 There is no more danger of perverse referrals
from payments to a withdrawing partner than there is from payments
of a share of the profits to continuing partners. 3 7 And payments to
withdrawing partners hardly commercialize law practice any more
than does sharing in the going firm.
Most importantly, the analysis in this Article demonstrates that
payments to withdrawing partners cannot be condemned on the
ground that they promote shirking. On the contrary, the payment is
best characterized as delayed compensation for the partner's past con-
tribution to the firm,38 which actually reduces shirking by partners
while they are associated with the firm.39 Thus, there is no ethical
133. See Corti v. Fleisher, 93 IIl. App. 3d 517, 417 N.E.2d 764 (1981).
134. See O'Hara v. Ahlgren, Blumenfeld & Kempster, 127 IM. 2d 333, 537 N.E.2d 730
(1989); Corti v. Fleisher, 93 Ill. App. 3d 517, 417 N.E.2d 764 (1981).
135. See Pauly, supr note 132.
136. This is recognized by DR 2-107(B) of the Model Code which permits "payment to
a former partner or associate pursuant to a separation or retirement agreement."
See Corti v. Fleisher, 93 11. App. 3d 517, 417 N.E.2d 764 (1981)(exception justifies
compensation to retiring partner even if not strictly based on services rendered,
but exception not applicable under facts of the case); Spayd v. Turner, Granzow &
Hollerkamp, 19 Ohio St. 3d 55, 482 N.E.2d 1232 (1985)(exception would permit
payment on account of goedwill to former partner, but such payment precluded
by contract). See also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
Formal Op. 327 (1971)(permitting payments to deceased partners' estates).
137. Indeed, the formation of firms has been explained as a way around the anti-fee-
splitting rule. See Pauly, supra note 132, at 351.
138. See supra text accompanying note 94.
139. Moreover, since the payment to the retired partner relates to the partnership's
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reason not to enforce contracts providing for goodwill payments to
withdrawing partners.
IV. DISTRIBUTIONS IN MARITAL DISSOLUTIONS
Many courts have let divorced spouses share in professional part-
nership goodwill, even to the extent that this includes the partners'
personal goodwill140 and even if the agreement denies the partner her-
self withdrawal compensation on account of goodwill.141 This is incon-
sistent both with the conventional definition of partnership goodwill
and with the narrower rule applied in partner withdrawal cases. It is
also inconsistent with the rule that a professional's earning capacity is
not properly considered marital property.142
Perhaps permitting the non-partner spouse to be paid for "good-
will" of professional partnerships is a way around the rule that a pro-
fessional's earning capacity is not properly considered marital
property. Characterizing the payment as goodwill of the partnership
avoids the appearance that it represents future earning capacity of the
partner. This approach should be subject to policies relating to mari-
tal awards. For example, the courts could decide that a non-partner
spouse who delayed consumption during the early years of his spouse's
career is entitled to share in the fruits of that career in the form of
expected income from the partnership. 143 The same reasoning might
entire caseload, it does not encourage shirking on particular cases as might the
payment of a referral fee. See O'Hara v. Ahlgren, Blumenfeld & Kempster, 127
Ill. 2d 333, 537 N.E.2d 730 (1989)(distinguishing on this ground payments to de-
ceased law partners from fee-sharing with lay person in connection with sale of
law practice).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 63-74.
141. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
142. See Aufmuth v. Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446,152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979), overruled
on other grounds, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980); In re
Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91
N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982); Frausto v. Frausto, 611 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App.
1981); DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44, 296 N.W.2d 761 (Ct. App. 1980). But see
O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 489 N.E.2d 712 (1985).
Some courts have provided for something like a property right in the profes-
sional degree by permitting reimbursement of the non-professional spouse in cer-
tain situations for contributions toward the other spouse's professional degree.
See Sullivan v. Sullivan, 37 Cal. 3d 762, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354, 691 P.2d 1020 (1984)(ap-
plying statute); In re Marriage of Francis, 442 N.W.2d 59 (Iowa 1989); Daniels v.
Daniels, 165 Mich. App. 726, 418 N.W.2d 924 (1988); Peterson v. Petersen, 737 P.2d
237 (Utah App. 1987). See generally Annotation, Spouse's Professional Degree of
License as Marital Property for Purposes ofAlimony, Support or Property Settle-
ment, 4 A.L.R.4th 1294 (1981).
143. For authorities supporting recognizing the contributions of non-partner spouses
to partner human capital, see Ford v. Ford, 782 P.2d 1304 (Nev. 1989); Parkman,
supra note 7, at 222. This is similar to the rule giving the non-professional spouse
a reimbursement-based property right in a professional degree. See supra note
142.
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justify a different result when the divorce comes later in the partner's
career.
Detailed analysis of this point is beyond the scope of this Article.
For present purposes it is enough to point out that this justification
rests on considerations relating only to the marital dissolution con-
text. Both the accounting definition of "goodwill" and the partner
withdrawal cases are beside the point. Indeed, erroneously putting
the question in terms of partnership goodwill is misleading if the court
is really awarding recovery based on the spouse's contributions to the
partner's own human capital. The result of this reasoning is illogically
to exclude the same contributions to non-partner reputations.144
As different considerations are relevant in the divorce cases, so the
considerations weighing against recognition of partner goodwill in the
withdrawal cases are irrelevant in the divorce context. Since recogniz-
ing partner goodwill in the divorce context does not result in a pay-
ment to the partner, it does not encourage opportunistic withdrawal.
Nor are the administrative costs of recognizing partner goodwill pro-
hibitive once the courts are willing to accept the artificial "excess
earnings" approach to valuing this asset.145
Similar reasons justify ignoring limitations on withdrawal compen-
sation in the partnership agreement for purposes of determining mari-
tal awards. The courts sometimes say that the agreement should not
control because it only applies to withdrawal,146 without fully ex-
plaining why the two situations should be distinguished. The reason is
that limitations in the agreement may be designed to reduce costly
disputes among the partners at withdrawal time, or to deter opportu-
nism by withdrawing partners.14 7 That is why the amount may not
fully reflect the "value" of the interest. The problem is not one of
valuation, but of determining the parties' underlying rights.
On the other hand, some considerations that are relevant in the
divorce context do militate against recognizing partner goodwill. Irre-
spective of how the spouse's right is characterized, recognizing the
right causes the partner spouse to make payments without having re-
ceived money or marketable assets from the partnership. Moreover,
the courts could decide that it is so costly to determine the value of
such a speculative asset that valuation should be left to formulas in
ante-nuptial agreements.148 In short, the question is not one of valua-
144. See Parkman, supra note 7, at 221-22.
145. See supra text accompanying note 65.
146. See cases cited supra note 74.
147. Some cases have said that the spouse's interest in the partnership goodwill is
analogous to his interest in an employee's deferred compensation. See Mitchell v.
Mitchell, 152 Ariz. 317, 732 P.2d 208 (1987); Sorenson v. Sorenson, 769 P.2d 820
(Utah 1989). But it is precisely because the interest being awarded to the spouse
is unlike deferred compensation that the spouse may be entitled to it.
148. See Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 497, 453 A.2d 527, 532 (1982)('Valuing a
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tion or accounting in the abstract, but of the rights of particular par-
ties in a particular situation.
V. CONCLUSION
The rules regarding the goodwill of professional partnerships are
better understood from the standpoint of policies governing payments
to withdrawing partners and partners' spouses than as a matter of the
accounting concept of goodwill.
As an accounting concept, "goodwill" is virtually impossible to
value in the professional firm because of the daunting problems inher-
ent in finding a comparable market valuation and in determining a
capitalized earnings value. Moreover, the accounting meaning of
goodwill does not explain the different results in the withdrawal and
divorce cases. If goodwill is an asset of professional firms, it should be
equally so for withdrawing partners and for partners' spouses.
The different legal results do make sense in the light of economic
analysis of partner compensation. From this perspective, the partner
withdrawal cases can be understood as a default legal rule that bal-
ances the costs and benefits of compensating withdrawing professional
partners. Although compensating these partners on the basis of the
firm's expected earnings might minimize shirking, such compensation
might involve prohibitive administrative, risk-bearing and opportu-
nism costs. The courts have in fact balanced these various kinds of
costs by permitting compensation for work-in-process. On the other
hand, wholly different considerations apply to payments to partners'
spouses in marital dissolutions.
More generally, this Article demonstrates that issues concerning
partners' rights that appear to depend on principles of accounting and
valuation really are better analyzed in the light of modern economic
theories of the firm.
professional degree in the hands of any particular individual at the start of his or
her career would involve a gamut of calculations that reduces to little more than
guesswork.").
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